Ep 147 - Back Porch Files: A Majority Is a Terrible Thing to Waste
Nov 6
6 min read
Election night is when a political party discovers how much power voters are willing to give it. The months afterward reveal whether it knows what to do with that power. There are speeches, celebrations, and declarations that history has been made. Eventually, though, the balloons come down and the public has every right to ask what it received in exchange for its votes. That is when an impressive election result begins its audition for a lasting place in history.

Democrats’ capture of both chambers of Congress makes this a consequential midterm election. By Thursday’s reporting, they had secured at least 253 House seats, already exceeding the winning parties’ totals after the celebrated takeovers of 1994, 2010, and 2018. That comparison measures the size of the incoming majority. The final seat swing requires completed results and a consistent starting point. Even with those qualifications, this belongs in the discussion of major modern midterm victories. Its lasting importance remains a question the incoming Congress will help answer.
A large majority supplies opportunity, and it invites overconfidence. Voters can reject an administration while disagreeing about what should replace its policies. Seat totals alone cannot establish approval of every proposal a party might pursue. Democrats should make a clear public argument for their priorities and connect those priorities to the problems people elected them to address. Claiming a blank check is considerably easier than earning support for a difficult decision.
The Congress elected in 1934 offers one measure of what successful action can leave behind. With expanded Democratic majorities and Franklin Roosevelt in the White House, lawmakers helped establish Social Security and the Wagner Act’s protections for organizing and collective bargaining. Those decisions became part of the structure of American life. They changed what workers could demand from employers and what people could expect as they aged. Their importance can be measured in protections subsequent generations inherited.
The achievement also came with serious exclusions. The original Social Security retirement system left out broad categories of workers, including agricultural and domestic workers, leaving many Black Americans outside its protection. Later Congresses expanded coverage. That history requires us to judge both what a majority built and whom it left waiting. Lasting institutions need people willing to defend them, improve them, and extend their benefits to those originally excluded.
Roosevelt’s congressional allies also had an advantage today’s Democrats will lack. They were working with a president eager to sign major reforms. An opposition Congress faces different constraints. That distinction should shape expectations, but it still leaves substantial room for action. Congress can investigate, negotiate, advance legislation, and force public decisions. The historical question is how intelligently and persistently its members use those powers.
Sometimes the first obstacle sits inside the majority’s own party. After the 1974 election, incoming Democrats strengthened a reform movement already underway in the House. Changes to committee leadership procedures were followed by the removal of three sitting chairmen. Reformers understood that an impressive majority could still be frustrated by its internal hierarchy. They challenged arrangements that protected powerful members and shaped which priorities could move forward.
That same period produced the Church Committee’s investigation of intelligence abuses and the establishment of permanent Senate intelligence oversight. Investigations reached across administrations of both parties. The work helped expose misconduct and contributed to institutional changes intended to restrain it. Those changes required political fights of their own, including resistance from senior senators comfortable with existing arrangements. Public revelations created an opportunity. Members still had to organize support for a response.
The leadership choices ahead deserve that kind of scrutiny. I want experienced people who understand Congress and are willing to shake it up. I would prefer new leadership over Hakeem Jeffries and Chuck Schumer, and I would like leaders whose campaign war chests are free of AIPAC money. Those are my standards for choosing leaders. Their effectiveness should be judged through decisions about committee assignments, legislative priorities, negotiations, and their willingness to sustain a justified confrontation.
Republicans have demonstrated both the possibilities and the costs of confrontation. The majority elected in 1994 forced consequential negotiations with Bill Clinton and helped enact a lasting restructuring of welfare. Its shutdown strategy also strengthened Clinton politically. Both outcomes belong in the assessment. A majority can secure policy changes while misjudging a particular fight, and tactical success still leaves the public entitled to judge the policies by their effects on people.
The 2010 election illustrates the value of preparation beyond the most visible contests. Republican gains in state legislatures positioned the party to influence post-census redistricting. Through REDMAP, Republicans targeted offices with the power to shape future representation. In Washington, their new House majority pressed spending demands during the 2011 debt-ceiling confrontation and helped secure the Budget Control Act. The methods carried costs, including increased federal borrowing expenses, but the broader strategy connected particular offices to particular sources of power.
Democrats should study that preparation. Know which decisions are approaching. Understand the procedures. Develop demands before a deadline becomes tomorrow morning’s emergency. Explain what a confrontation is intended to achieve and who will benefit. Political aggressiveness needs judgment, especially when the public bears the costs. A dramatic standoff is easier to produce than a durable improvement in people’s lives.
Accountability must be among the improvements Democrats pursue. Americans who want officials questioned about abuses deserve more than reassuring language about avoiding revenge. Evidence should determine what investigations establish and which consequences are justified. Leadership’s responsibility is to organize the work needed to reach those judgments. Congress can address economic concerns while investigating misconduct. It has enough members, committees, and staff to divide the assignments.
The House elected in 2018 demonstrated that capacity. It impeached Trump on December 18, 2019, and passed legislation implementing the North American trade agreement the following day. Yet its oversight also demonstrated real limits. Trump was acquitted by the Senate, and disputes over financial-record subpoenas consumed valuable time in court. Investigation, public exposure, and meaningful consequences are separate stages of accountability. Each requires preparation.
These examples suggest three expectations for the incoming Congress. Oversight should become more demanding, with its seriousness visible in staffing, document requests, hearings, and responses to obstruction. Appointments and essential legislation should become points of negotiation, with specific demands and identifiable results. And disagreements within the Democratic Party should reveal how willing its leaders and members are to use their new authority. The choices made before the first major confrontation will tell us a great deal about their readiness for it.
Obstacles will remain. Trump retains the veto, and overriding it requires two-thirds support among members voting in each chamber. Courts can delay disputes, and members of a majority can disagree. Voters deserve an honest account of those difficulties, accompanied by evidence of effort. What did leaders attempt? What happened when the first approach failed? Which opportunities did they pursue, and which did they allow to disappear? Public office should require more ingenuity than discovering a procedural reason to surrender.
The historical importance of this election will emerge through decisions still ahead. Democrats have an opportunity to secure protections, expose wrongdoing, and leave government better equipped to serve the public. People who voted for change should keep pressing for it, including when the officials who need pressure belong to their own party. Winning gives a majority the chance to make history. Understanding how to exercise the power voters gave it determines what kind of history follows.
SOURCES
2026 congressional election results and outstanding races — https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2026/nov/04/midterm-elections-full-results-senate-house-governor-races
Associated Press explanation of its calls for Democratic control of Congress — https://www.ap.org/the-definitive-source/behind-the-news/calling-control-of-congress-in-the-2026-midterm-elections/
Historical House majority changes and election gains — https://history.house.gov/Institution/Majority-Changes/Majority-Changes/
The Congress elected in 1934 and its New Deal achievements — https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/74th/
Original Social Security coverage exclusions and their historical context — https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p49.html
Expansion of Social Security coverage over time — https://www.ssa.gov/policy/about/oasdi-reference.html
Passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 — https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-of-the-wagner-act
Supreme Court decision upholding the Wagner Act in 1937 — https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1937-act-held-constitutional
Changes to labor protections under the Taft-Hartley Act — https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions
The Congress elected in 1974 and its legislative record — https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/94th/
Congressional Research Service history of House reforms and committee leadership changes — https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20031020_RL31835_871c33a8137cba0d3cbe25f2337dd292f6b156e0.pdf
Black members’ role in reforming congressional power structures — https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Permanent-Interest/Institutional-Advancement/
Church Committee investigation, findings, and subsequent reforms — https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/investigations/church-committee.htm
Creation of permanent Senate intelligence oversight and resistance to reform — https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/senate-stories/senate-creates-the-select-committee-on-intelligence.htm
The Republican Congress elected in 1994, shutdowns, and welfare legislation — https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/104th/
Political consequences of the Gingrich–Clinton confrontations — https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/campaigns-and-elections
Congressional Research Service legislative history of the TANF welfare overhaul — https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44668/R44668.19.pdf
Republican statehouse gains in 2010 and their redistricting significance — https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/03/02/ahead-of-redistricting-democrats-seek-to-reverse-statehouse-declines/
REDMAP strategy and partisan redistricting — https://campaignlegal.org/update/address-underlying-causes-capitol-insurrection-we-must-end-gerrymandering
The Congress elected in 2010 and its budget confrontations — https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/112th/
Government Accountability Office findings on the 2011 debt-limit dispute and borrowing costs — https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-12-701
Congressional Budget Office explanation of the Budget Control Act’s spending caps and enforcement mechanisms — https://www.cbo.gov/publication/42754
The Congress elected in 2018, impeachment, and pandemic legislation — https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/116th/
Official House record of Trump’s impeachments and Senate outcomes — https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/
Government Accountability Office decision on withholding Ukraine security assistance — https://www.gao.gov/products/b-331564
Supreme Court decision concerning congressional subpoenas for Trump’s financial records — https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/19-715
Congressional Research Service overview of USMCA labor provisions and the December 19, 2019, House vote — https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11308/IF11308.4.pdf
Senate authority over presidential nominations — https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/nominations.htm
Congressional Research Service explanation of presidential veto overrides — https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS22654.html



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